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STATE (UN)SEPARATED POWERS 
AND COMMANDEERING 
Aaron P. Brecher* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the more controversial aspects of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act1 (PPACA) is the requirement that a health care 
exchange for the comparison and purchase of approved health insurance 
plans be established in each state.2  The PPACA mandates that if a state’s 
government chooses not to establish an approved exchange, the federal 
government will do so, with or without state cooperation.3  But in a 
potentially serious blow to the PPACA’s successful implementation, the 
U.S. Supreme Court will soon decide a challenge contending that 
participants in federally established exchanges are not entitled to the tax 
subsidies available to participants in state-established exchanges.4  One 
unfamiliar with the anti-commandeering doctrine might be forgiven for 
wondering:  Wouldn’t it be easier for the federal government to merely 
establish standards for the health care exchanges and order the states to 
establish and maintain them according to the specifications?  But alas, the 
Supreme Court has held that while state officials must obey federal law and 
not interfere with its administration, Congress may not compel or otherwise 
“commandeer” state officials to legislate according to federal dictates5 or to 
enforce federal law.6  Notably, the Constitution allows state court judges to 
be compelled to hear federal claims to the extent they hear similar state 
claims.7 
This Essay argues that the Court’s line between state judges and other 
state officials is not as clean as the case law suggests.  Specifically, early 
state constitutions, as well as the British constitutional order prevailing 
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 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2012). 
 3. Abby Goodnough, Liking It or Not, States Prepare for Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 24, 2012, at A1. 
 4. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
 5. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–66 (1992). 
 6. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–31 (1997). 
 7. See id. at 928–29; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–94 (1947). 
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before the U.S. Constitution was enacted—which did not separate powers 
as rigidly as the U.S. Constitution—combine to undermine the distinction.  
Taking this line of analysis seriously is not to deny that commandeering 
state executive or legislative officials raises federalism concerns.  But 
paying more careful attention to early state conceptions of the separation of 
powers furthers federalist goals in another way:  it engenders respect for the 
states’ freedom to deviate from the model of government the U.S. 
Constitution establishes for the federal government.  More generally, and 
perhaps more importantly, this Essay follows in the tradition of other 
scholarship in emphasizing that one should not look only to the U.S. 
Constitution to understand the American constitutional tradition:  the many 
state constitutions throughout American history are a part of that tradition 
also.8 
I.   PRINTZ AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
In Printz v. United States,9 the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required local law 
enforcement officers to run background checks on prospective handgun 
buyers within their respective jurisdictions.10  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia grounded the decision in federalism concerns and reasoned 
that such schemes violated the Constitution based on the Court’s 
precedents, the Constitution’s structure, quotations from The Federalist, 
and the dearth of commandeering schemes in early congressional practice.11  
Following an earlier case that had invalidated commandeering of state 
legislatures,12 Printz held that the structure of the Constitution permitted 
commandeering of only state judges but not other state officials.13  The 
Court’s commandeering jurisprudence has attracted considerable scholarly 
commentary, much of it critical.14 
Though the bulk of the majority opinion (and the dissent) focused on 
federalism, one brief section also stated that the commandeering scheme at 
issue would violate the separation of powers, insofar as only the President is 
empowered to enforce federal law.15  The section consisted of a breezy 
invocation of the Take Care Clause, citations to The Federalist, and an 
 
 8. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED:  AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 28–30 (2012). 
 9. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 10. Id. at 933–34. 
 11. Id. at 905–29. 
 12. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 13. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29. 
 14. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1295–1302 (2009); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and 
the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 201–02; Wesley J. Campbell, 
Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1106–09 (2013); Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:  Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 824–30, 855–56 
(1998); Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1133–37 
(2014). 
 15. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922–23. 
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article about the unitary executive theory.16  This very short segment of the 
Printz opinion has been subjected to only occasional scholarly attention.17  
But prior scholarship has pointed out some problems with the kind of 
separation of powers reasoning deployed by the Printz Court:  the 
explanation may not adequately account for voluntary state enforcement of 
federal law, such as enforcement pursuant to conditional spending regimes, 
that have consistently been sustained in the face of constitutional challenge, 
and it also fails to persuade that invalidating the offending legislation is the 
best remedy.18 
But the separation of powers analysis in Printz also inspires a different 
approach to the commandeering issue, one that focuses on the separation of 
powers (or lack thereof) at the state level. 
II.   UNSEPARATED POWERS IN EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Early state constitutional arrangements and the eighteenth-century British 
constitutional order suggest not only that the line between state judges and 
other state officials was not always clear, but also that those who wrote and 
ratified the U.S. Constitution contemplated just such a state of affairs. 
The Constitution contains no explicit requirement that states separate 
their powers.  To be sure, the federal government must guarantee to each 
state “a Republican Form of Government”19 and states may not deprive 
persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”20  
Though these clauses’ meanings are underdetermined by the constitutional 
text—indeed, the contours of the due process requirement are constantly 
litigated—one can imagine that wholly unseparated powers might violate 
them.  If, for example, the same state institution made, enforced, and 
interpreted law, and meted out criminal punishment absent independent 
review, that arrangement would likely raise serious due process concerns.  
But by and large, the Constitution gives states considerable leeway in 
organizing their own governments.21 
There is no reason to assume that the federal model of separated powers 
was understood at the time of ratification to be the one that states would or 
should adopt.  Until 2009, the U.K. House of Lords functioned as a court of 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Among the articles that have examined whether the federal separation of powers 
forbids commandeering are Jay S. Bybee, Printz, the Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the 
Trash Can:  Has Justice Scalia Picked the Court’s Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269 
(2001), and Evan H. Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal 
Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075 (1997). 
 18. Caminker, supra note 17, at 1077–78. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. IV.  But that clause has been held nonjusticiable under the political 
question doctrine. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  But judicial review of a state’s separation of powers 
for compliance with due process also may be unavailable. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 
71, 84 (1902). 
 21. A fact that Printz itself recognized. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 908 n.2. 
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last resort in addition to the upper chamber of Parliament.22  Specifically, 
the role of the king’s governing council in the Middle Ages, which 
eventually evolved into Parliament, included a judicial function for 
centuries.23  And though the jurisdiction of the House of Lords would 
expand and contract over time,24 this was the system that prevailed at the 
time the U.S. Constitution was ratified and with which the ratifying 
generation would have been familiar. 
In colonial America, moreover, many colonies had governmental 
institutions that blurred the lines among legislative, executive, and judicial 
officers.25  Both Massachusetts and Virginia permitted their governors and 
legislative officials to decide judicial cases and make rules.26  Nowhere 
were executive officers, legislators, and judges cleanly distinguished from 
one another.27 
State practices soon after the Constitution was ratified may be similarly 
useful to interpreting constitutional meaning.  The history of state 
constitutional conventions shows a considerable willingness to reject 
aspects of the federal model of separated powers.28  Under the New York 
constitutions of 1777 and 1821, the state’s highest court “consisted of the 
president of the senate, the senators, the chancellor, and the justices of the 
supreme court.”29  Similarly, the New Jersey constitution of 1776 provided 
that the governor sit on the appellate court of last resort.30  Even when the 
U.S. Supreme Court encountered such blended institutions, it passed on 
them without comment.  Consider Calder v. Bull,31 an old chestnut of 1L 
Constitutional Law courses used to demonstrate the divide between natural 
law theories and legal positivism; there, the Connecticut state legislature sat 
essentially as a court, passing a law to overturn a ruling of a probate court 
and ordering a new hearing in the dispute.32  And in 1902, admittedly much 
later in American history, the Court was explicit in its recognition of state 
authority to separate powers as the state saw fit: 
Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be 
kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of 
persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, 
exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of 
government, is for the determination of the State.  And its determination 
one way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiry, whether the due 
process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
 
 22. See generally GLENN DYMOND, HOUSE OF LORDS, LIBRARY NOTE:  THE APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS (2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/ 
documents/lords-library/lln2009-010appellate.pdf. 
 23. Id. at 2. 
 24. See id. at 2–6. 
 25. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 7–17 (3d ed. 2005). 
 26. Id. at 10–11. 
 27. See id. at 14. 
 28. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 3, 97 (2006). 
 29. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 91. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
 32. Id. at 386–87. 
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respected by the State or its representatives when dealing with matters 
involving life or liberty.33 
Thus, not only can we be confident that unseparated powers are 
permissible under the Constitution, but the evidence provided by the 
colonial and early Republic experience suggests that such arrangements 
were understood to be entirely unremarkable at the time of federal 
constitutional ratification.  This conclusion seriously undercuts the 
soundness of Printz’s distinction between state judges and other state 
officials. 
III.   IF STATE JUDGES MAY BE COMMANDEERED, 
OTHER OFFICIALS OUGHT TO BE SIMILARLY SUSCEPTIBLE 
TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMANDEERING 
The historical evidence regarding the separation of powers at the state 
level suggests that if state judges can be compelled to hear federal claims, 
other state officials can be similarly commandeered.  The Supremacy 
Clause does not distinguish between the different types of officials, and a 
functional distinction likely would have been unworkable at the time of the 
Founding and remains so today.  Bearing these considerations in mind may 
help foster respect for federalism, albeit in a different way than the Printz 
Court thought was important. 
The fuzzy lines separating state judges from other officers undermine the 
Printz distinction as a general matter.  But the distinction is even weaker 
when one considers and rejects some of Printz’s justifications for the 
distinction.  First, the decision noted that judicial commandeering was 
justified not by the Supremacy Clause generally but by the Judges Clause,34 
which binds state judges to respect federal law in conflict with state law.35  
But as the dissent and a number of scholars demonstrate, that is not a viable 
reading of the Judges Clause.36  The clause instead should be read as a 
conflict-of-law rule for those cases when state judges hear claims in which 
state and federal laws contradict each other, rather than an affirmative grant 
of authority to the federal government to demand that state courts hear 
federal causes of action.37  This reading makes sense of the clause’s 
language pertaining to “contrary” state law. 
Moreover, suggesting, as Printz appears to, that one can functionally 
distinguish judicial officers from other types of state officers may not be a 
 
 33. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 35. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997). 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty 
and Subordinacy:  May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1036–38 (1995). 
 37. See Caminker, supra note 36, at 1036–37; Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, 
Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:  Implications for the Theory of Judicial 
Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 80–81 (1998) (arguing that the Judges Clause represents 
means of implementing power to commandeer state courts, rather than the source of that 
power). 
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sound rule, as tensions within the Printz opinion itself demonstrate.  Simply 
put, when titles and functions are blended as much as they were in some 
early state constitutions, and as much as they might be in a hypothetical 
future state system, it is hard to distinguish between a court and an 
executive body.  Printz noted that the federal government defending the 
Brady law could find no refuge in a prior case upholding a requirement that 
a state administrative agency apply federal law while acting in a judicial 
capacity.38  But earlier in the opinion, the Court discussed early acts of 
Congress requiring state courts, for example, to transmit citizenship 
applications to the Secretary of State and order the deportation of alien 
enemies in wartime.39  Those tasks seem fundamentally executive in nature, 
but the Court minimized their significance because the statutes only 
compelled judges to act, as opposed to other types of officials.  That 
reasoning implies that functional distinctions are not enough; one must look 
to what type of state official is acting.  But in our constitutional order, 
where states are afforded considerable freedom to structure their own 
governments, it may not always be possible to determine when a state 
official qualifies as a judge.  Moreover, the extent of states’ discretion to 
assign nonjudicial functions to judges and judicial functions to other 
officers may go well beyond the minor examples discussed in Printz—
examples which may not show a real difference between state systems and 
the federal separation of powers.40  The minor executive tasks distinguished 
away in Printz are different in kind from the circumstances in Calder and 
under early state constitutional provisions naming legislators and executive 
officials as members of state courts.  There is nothing in the Constitution to 
prevent states from adopting similar structures in the future, and a rule that 
Congress may commandeer judges but not others is unlikely to be workable 
if any do. 
Ultimately, the source of authority for judicial commandeering makes no 
difference to this analysis.  For example, whether the power to compel state 
courts to hear federal claims is derived from Congress’s Article I powers41 
or from some structural constitutional principle of union,42 the distinction 
between judges and other officials as a matter of state constitutional 
structure is untenable and creates serious doubt about the viability of the 
Printz distinction. 
It is worth noting briefly that undercutting the distinction between 
judicial officers and other state officials also could suggest an alternative 
conclusion:  that the commandeering of any state officials, including 
 
 38. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929 (majority opinion) (distinguishing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742 (1982), on the grounds that it upheld a federal statute that only established 
preconditions for continued state regulation). 
 39. Id. at 905–06. 
 40. For instance, by statute, the Chief Justice of the United States serves on the Board of 
Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, a job that also seems executive rather than judicial in 
nature. See 20 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).  But I have seen no suggestion that assigning this task to a 
judicial officer offends the federal separation of powers. 
 41. See Redish & Sklaver, supra note 37, at 88–90. 
 42. See Seinfeld, supra note 14, at 1133–37. 
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judges, is contrary to the Constitution’s federalist structure.  But that 
conclusion seems untenable in light of the long history of state judges being 
expected to hear federal claims on an equal footing with state claims.  To 
overrule Testa v. Katt43 would upset the applecart in a way that rethinking 
the commandeering decisions would not.  First, New York, Printz, and the 
older commandeering cases on which they relied are more recent.  Second, 
as Printz points out as one basis for its holding, it is difficult to find many, 
if any, other examples of Congress attempting the sort of commandeering 
schemes invalidated in those cases.  Thus, the damage to settled 
expectations resulting from a reassessment of the commandeering cases 
would be much less than from freeing state courts to reject federal claims 
for any reason they choose. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay provides one more reason to be skeptical of the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in the commandeering cases.  Printz’s separation of 
powers discussion is unsatisfying to say the least.  But the case’s holding is 
rooted in federalism.  Others have critiqued the historical foundations of—
and the policy objections to—that rationale.  That is well beyond the scope 
of this Essay.  Rather, I hope that my argument suggests the possibility that 
recognizing a controversial federal commandeering power would not 
necessarily be an affront to federalism.  Instead of superimposing 
assumptions about the federal separation of powers onto the states, 
respecting the alternative structural constitutional arrangements that states 
may choose might actually enhance federalist goals. 
 
 
 43. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
